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That Britain is (and has been) a class-conscious society verges on being
a clich. 1 Britons, it is often commented, think about class too much.
Americans, on the other hand, think about class too little, and are rarely
criticized for it. While stopping short of advocating heightened class
consciousness, this Book Note suggests that by not thinking about class, we
overlook ways in which class biases may influence legal decisions.
American legal thought could stand to borrow a page from class-conscious
British history, as exemplified in Joss Marsh's Word Crimes. Word Crimes
is both an innovative work of literary and legal history and an example of
how class-conscious analysis can illuminate the dilemmas inherent in
regulating the manner of speech. Word Crimes brings to light the curious
and largely neglected history of prosecutions for blasphemy in nineteenth-
century England,2 but its story is relevant to current American attempts to
regulate offensive speech as well.
Marsh's work is the first book-length exploration of the two hundred or
so blasphemy trials that occurred in England in the nineteenth century.
* Professor of English, Indiana University.
1. See, e.g., DAVID CANNADINE, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASS IN BRITAIN at xi (1999).
2. For other historical treatments of blasphemy, see LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY (1993)
[hereinafter LEVY, BLASPHEMY]; LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF
THE OFFENSE OF BLASPHEMY (1981), which is an earlier version of Blasphemy-. and Milncr S.
Ball, Cross and Sword, Victim and Law: A Tentative Response to Leonard Levy's Treason Against
God, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1007 (1983). Robert Post also deals with a number of these cases in
Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First
Amendment, 76 CAL L. REV. 297, 307-09 (1988) (discussing Regina v. Hetherington, 4 St. Tr.
N.S. 593 (1841); Regina v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox C.C. 217 (1883); and Regina v. Ramsay and Foote.
15 Cox C.C. 231 (Q.B.D. 1883)).
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Most readers will no doubt share her surprise that so many prosecutions
could take place in an era commonly associated with the growth of
secularism.3 Marsh explains this apparent paradox, however, by pointing to
class conflict. In Word Crimes, Marsh argues for recognition of blasphemy
as a "class crime of language" (p. 8); in doing so, she takes nineteenth-
century blasphemy out of its normal position as a cul-de-sac on the road to
freedom of speech. However, to say Word Crimes is simply about
blasphemy prosecutions is to underestimate the richness of theory and
observation that Marsh presents. Marsh's work also takes the literary
history of censorship into the nineteenth century,4 revealing the crucial
impact of literary strategies of "encoding, indirection, and strategic
compensatory maneuvers" (p. 12) on the development of the Victorian
novel and its characteristic employment of euphemism. Along the way,
Marsh provides fascinating new information about the blaspheming
predecessors of Dickens (pp. 51-60), the interwoven legal and literary
worlds of Victorian England (pp. 94-98), and Thomas Hardy's concern with
blasphemy (pp. 269-319). This Book Note, however, concentrates on
Marsh's class-based description of blasphemy as an aspect of legal history
with continuing relevance today.' While space limitations make this
selection necessary, it also must be kept in mind that Word Crimes was not
written primarily as a work of legal history and that this focus necessarily
overlooks many of the insights Marsh offers.
I
Marsh identifies three waves of blasphemy prosecutions that
correspond to periods of heightened class tension in England. The first took
place between 1817 and 1825, when the publishers William Hone and
Richard Carlile, along with the "volunteers" who managed Carlile's
London print shop during his incarceration, were tried. These trials
coincided with the era of the Peterloo protests, named after the 1819 march
3. For the secularization thesis, see OWEN CHADWICK, THE SECULARIZATION OF THE
EUROPEAN MIND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1975). But see BOYD HILTON, THE AGE Of
ATONEMENT (1988) (describing the influence of evangelical ideas on Victorian economic and
political thought).
4. For a literary history of censorship in 17th-century England, see ANNABEL PATTERSON.
CENSORSHIP AND INTERPRETATION: THE CONDITIONS OF WRITING AND READING IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND (1984). For a more recent work on censorship in Victorian England, see
BARBARA LECKIE, CULTURE AND ADULTERY: THE NOVEL, THE NEWSPAPER, AND THE LAW.
1857-1914 (1999).
5. Unlike in the United States, blasphemy laws have remained on the books in Great Britain
and Australia. For consideration of the problems posed by this survival and of the laws' potential
application to race relations, see Michael Bohlander, Public Peace, Rational Discourse and the
Law of Blasphemy, 21 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 162 (1992); Reid Mortensen, Blasphemy in a Secular
State: A Pardonable Sin?, 17 U.N.S.W. L.J. 409 (1994), and Sebastian Poulter, Towards
Legislative Reform of the Blasphemy and Racial Hatred Laws, 1991 PUB. L. 37 1.
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in Manchester at which unarmed working-class protesters were killed by
the local constabulary.6 A second wave occurred in the early 1840s, during
which Henry Hetherington, the Chartist leader, and Jacob Holyoake and
Charles Southwell, secularist journalists, were tried. This wave
corresponded to the early years of Chartism, the largely working-class
movement that demanded the passage of a Charter that included universal
male suffrage and annual parliaments.7 Finally, a third wave in the mid-
1880s included the trials of Charles Bradlaugh, England's first openly
atheistic Member of Parliament, and George Foote, Bradlaugh's successor
as president of the National Secular Society. These trials were
contemporaneous with the agitation before the third reform bill of 1884,
which extended working-class suffrage. In Marsh's narrative, the fates of
blasphemy and political radicalism, influenced by the French Revolution
and the writings of Thomas Paine, were closely entwined. The unrepentant
blasphemers placed themselves in "a distinct tradition of conscious
protest.., that stretches back to 1817 and beyond into the 1790s" (p. 6).s
All of these stories culminate in the trial Marsh selects as the central
subject of her study: the 1883 blasphemy prosecution of George Foote,
editor of the Freethinker, an avowedly secularist publication that
prominently featured "Comic Bible" cartoons. Foote was brought to trial
three times through private prosecutions for criminal blasphemy. He was
convicted and sentenced to a year of hard labor in Holloway Gaol. In his
defense, Foote pointed to Matthew Arnold, T.H. Huxley, John Stuart Mill,
and other upper-class doubters whose religious skepticism had not resulted
in prosecutions for blasphemy. Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, in the third
and most famous trial, summarily rejected Foote's arguments, finding "a
difference not only in degree, but in kind and nature. There is a grave and
earnest tone, a reverent-perhaps I might even say a religious-spirit about
the very attacks on Christianity itself which we find in the authors referred
to ... ." 9 Coleridge then wrote the distinction between matter and manner
into the law of England, proclaiming: "I now lay it down as law, that, if the
6. See ASA BRIGGS, THE AGE OF IMPROVEMENT 207-14 (1959). Working-class anger
resulted from the economic downturn following the immediate postwar boom. and resentment at
the government's subservience to aristocratic, landed interests, as demonstrated by the Corn Laws
of 1815, which subsidized the price of grain to the benefit of landowners and to the detriment of
workers.
7. Chartists demanded manhood suffrage, a secret ballot, equal electoral districts, abolition of
property requirements for members of Parliament, pay for members of Parliament, and annual
Parliaments. They were most influential between 1838 and 1842. There is an extensive literature
on Chartism. For a recent critical interpretation, see GARETH STEDMAN JONES. Rethinking
Chartism, in LANGUAGES OF CLASS: STUDIES IN ENGLISH WORKING CLASS HISTORY 1832-1982,
at 90, 90-178 (1983).
8. For a discussion of radical politics in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, see JAMES A.
EPSTEIN, RADIcAL EXPRESION: PoLmcAL LANGUAGE, RITUAL AND SYMBOL IN ENGLAND,
1790-1850 (1994).
9. Regina v. Ramsay and Foote, 15 Cox C.C. 231, 239 (Q.B.D. 1883) (emphasis added).
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decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion
may be attacked without the writer being guilty of blasphemy." "0
Coleridge's new definition of blasphemy was not without precedent. In
1841, a parliamentary commission had reported that application of the
penal law against blasphemers was largely reserved for cases in which
"insulting language is used." "1 Similarly, in the 1841 blasphemy case
against Henry Hetherington, Chief Justice Denman instructed the jury that:
[The question of blasphemy] must be, in a great degree, a question
as to the tone, and style, and spirit, in which such enquiries are
conducted.... [E]ven discussions upon [the great doctrines of
Christianity] may be by no means a matter of criminal prosecution,
but, if they be carried on in a sober and temperate and decent style,
even those discussions may be tolerated, and may take place
without criminality attaching to them: but that, if the tone and spirit
is that of offence, and insult, and ridicule... the jury will hardly
feel that the indictments are undeserved.
12
Against this backdrop, Coleridge merely codified what had already
emerged as practice in the law of blasphemy, namely, that the important
element in the offense was not the denial of church doctrine but rather the
style in which such opinions were expressed.
By focusing on manner, Coleridge's definition of blasphemy inevitably
implicated class, just as his own opinion sought to separate out the upper-
class skeptics from the defendants at bar. Foote himself argued that
"[blasphemy is simply skepticism expressed in plain language and sold at
the people's price" (p. 127). Marsh notes that "the theoretical equality of
all men before the law breaks down when the crime in question is a crime
of words, language, style" (p. 159). Perhaps not coincidentally, this
transformation of the law of blasphemy from a crime of substance into one
of style occurred at a time when accents in spoken language were
increasingly interpreted as markers of social status. Beginning in the late
eighteenth century and continuing into the nineteenth century, ideas of
"proper" spoken English hardened. As one commentator noted, by 1881,
"H, in speech, is an unmistakable mark of class distinction in England, as
every person soon discovers." 13 As speech became the primary evidence of
class membership, blasphemy's legal definition as a crime of linguistic
style was inextricably linked to class identity.
10. Id. at 238.
11. Regina v. Lemon, 1979 All E.R. 898, 913 (H.L.) (Edmund-Davies, L.J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 924 (Scarman, L.J.) (emphasis added).
13. LYNDA MUGGLESTONE, 'TALKING PROPER': THE RISE OF ACCENT AS SOCIAL SYMBOL
70 (1995) (quoting ALFRED LEACH, THE LETTER H 10 (London, n.p. 1881)).
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The judicial condemnation of blasphemy was also based on the
potential for social unrest. Prosecutors pointed to the influence of
blasphemy on unsuspecting members of the lower classes. Blasphemy was
defined as that which was "calculated to mislead the ignorant and unwary"
(p. 84). Marsh's evidence clearly demonstrates an upper-class desire to
control the flow of viewpoints to the lower classes. Outrageous speech was
thought to be dangerous when it appeared to be directed at members of the
lower classes. "What would your feelings be if you found such a paper had
been put into the hands of your offspring and domestics?" demanded
Attorney-General Gifford in one blasphemy prosecution (p. 62)."4 The use
of a term such as "half-pay," for example, was thought to be indicative of
incendiary intent not because of any intrinsic content, but rather because it
would be readily understandable to a lower-class audience familiar with the
practice of placing soldiers on half-pay during peacetime (p. 118).
Similarly, the price of an allegedly offensive work was used as a gauge of
its intended audience, and works priced in pence were subjected to far more
searching scrutiny than those priced in guineas. Underlying this paternalism
was the fear of revolution; as Marsh writes, "[Flear of insurrection inflated
the charges of coarse 'grossness' and vulgar 'brutality' to produce a belief
in the potential and even actual revolutionary 'violence' of plain speech"
(p. 75).
II
Despite the fact that Word Crimes is first and foremost a work of
literary history, Marsh's deployment of evidence is, at times, disconcerting
to the legal historian. For a work that purports to center on a single case,
Word Crimes is curiously indifferent to the legal record of the case itself.
Marsh does not dwell upon the legal opinion that is the centerpiece of her
work; indeed, Coleridge's reasoning in Regina v. Ramsay and Foote, aside
from the manner/matter distinction, is left unanalyzed. Instead, Marsh's
main sources are pamphlets and memoirs.
Oddly enough, if class analysis is one of the main strengths of Word
Crimes, it is also the book's Achilles heel. For historical background,
Marsh relies heavily on the scholarship of a previous generation of cultural
Marxist scholars who placed class (and class consciousness) at the center of
historical progress. 5 As a result, Marsh tends to dismiss non-class-based
14. This concern persisted well into the 20th century. Prosecuting counsel at the 1960 trial of
Penguin Books for D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover asked. "Would you want your
servant to read this book?" (p. 98).
15. See, e.g., E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGUSH WORKING CLASS (1963):
RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE LONG REVOLUTION (1961). For current skepticism regarding the
Marxist approach to British history, see CANNADINE, supra note 1, at 8-16. On cultural Marxism
1999]
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motivations for blasphemy. In a work dealing with the crime of blasphemy,
religious belief gets shockingly short shrift: Nineteenth-century
blasphemers who were motivated largely by non-Anglican religious
convictions are labeled "religious extremists" and explicitly excluded from
Marsh's study (pp. 13-14); statements of religious belief in working-class
periodicals are disregarded as "quasi-Christian" (p. 87).
Class is troublesome in a number of other ways as well. Marsh tends to
overlook the problems raised by the uncertain relationship between class
language and "reality." Recent historians have tended to examine class as a
discursive formation rather than as a simple socioeconomic category. As
summarized by social historian David Cannadine, the events of the years
covered in Word Crimes are not best described as "'[t]he making of class',
be it the middle class or the working class .... What was going on was an
unprecedentedly agitated discussion of social structure .. 16 Had Marsh
acknowledged the tensions between class as rhetoric and class as reality,
her account would have been richer and more convincing. Instead, she takes
for granted the existence of classes, even when her own evidence resists
simple class divisions based on a tripartite model. For example, while
Marsh grounds her argument on class, her own stated class categories fit
her narrative awkwardly at best. At the outset, she informs us that "[aill
except a handful [of blasphemers] belonged to... the elite of the working
class .... For convenience, this study calls this combination of upper
working and lower middle classes 'lower class"' (p. 5). One is left to
wonder exactly what is meant by a "lower class" encompassing members
of the middle class.17 Similarly, Marsh is influenced by contemporary
Victorian practice in her discussion of printers and essayists as members of
the working class or as artisans, largely on the basis of their intended
audiences (pp. 74 & 118). Class as discursive formation and class as social
and economic status cohere uneasily, just as a simple tripartite framework
strains uncomfortably against the complexities of Victorian society.
III
Coleridge's distinction between matter and manner has remained a
problematic part of the jurisprudence governing speech. It has echoes in
in general, and Thompson and Williams in particular, see DENNIS DWORKIN, CULTURAL
MARXISM IN POSTWAR BRITAIN (1997).
16. CANNADINE, supra note 1, at 75. For examples of the discursive approach to class, see
JONES, supra note 7; and DROR WAHRMAN, IMAGINING THE MIDDLE CLASS: TIlE POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION OF CLASS IN BRITAIN, C. 1780-1840 (1995).
17. Cannadine describes an oscillation between a tripartite model of class-upper, middle.
and lower-and an oppositional model--elite and non-elite, or "us" and "them." See




today's efforts to define the parameters of permissible regulation of speech
in the United States. At first glance, however, it is difficult to see how such
efforts might relate to nineteenth-century English blasphemy law.'8
Blasphemy and the issue of class bias in the law seem quite different from
our current regime of speech regulation. Blasphemy has scarcely figured in
American law, 9 despite a scattering of nineteenth-century cases in which it
was found to be a common-law crime applicable in the United States as
well as England.' Class, meanwhile, rarely enters the ambit of legal
discussion. When class is discussed, it is often considered a proxy for (or a
complication of) race. But, considered as analogy, the history of blasphemy
can reveal ways in which class persists as a hidden presence in the law of
speech governing both obscenity and hate speech. 2' Some caveats are in
order here. I do not argue that a simple, tripartite class structure captures the
social complexity of contemporary America. Nor do I mean to suggest that
hate speech is an integral part of working-class identity.. However, the
manner of communication still serves as a class marker. For this reason, the
striking similarities between 'the justifications advanced in nineteenth-
century British blasphemy prosecutions and those put forth for modem
speech regulation in the area of hate speech reveal the potential for
disparate impact across classes in contemporary hate-speech regulation.
This possibility exists on at least two levels: First, individuals of lower
socioeconomic status may be charged under such laws at a disproportionate
rate; second, unconscious class biases may influence judges to treat
offenders with greater severity because of a perception that such language
crimes are lower class in nature. Whether such bias exists is extremely
difficult to know, as the class status of defendants is almost never described
explicitly and can only be guessed at through such markers as language.
But the difficulty of even formulating the questions reinforces the point that
discussion of class is effaced in American legal thought.
Obscenity cases are an area in which the analogy to blasphemy is
relatively clear. Foote's most obvious modem successor would seem to be
Andres Serrano, the photographer whose picture of a crucifix immersed in
urine ignited public controversy in 1989. Foote's "Comic Bible" cartoons
offended through, among other things, their depiction of the naked rear end
18. Robert Post links blasphemy law by analogy to proposed contemporary regulation of
pornography. However, Post discusses blasphemy in terms of pluralism, with reference to ethnic
group[s]" rather than class. See Post, supra note 2, at 303.
19. In Britain, however, two prominent cases have focused attention on the remaining
blasphemy laws: the Gay News case of 1977 and thefanta against Salman Rushdie, which British
Muslims sought to enforce in England through a private blasphemy prosecution. See Poulter,
supra note 5.
20. See LEVY, BLASPHEMY, supra note 2, at 400-23.
21. For an overview of hate-speech regulation, see FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE. PUNISHING
HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAw (1999).
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of God (p. 142). In the United States, obscenity has been configured as a
conflict between youth culture and tradition ("a sept[uajgenerian in
Tuscaloosa and a teenager in Las Vegas" 2), or between the artistic avant-
garde and community-based standards of decency ("[a]vant-garde
artistes... remain free to 9pater les bourgeois" 23). By locating the conflict
as one taking place between different aesthetic philosophies, class is
removed from the equation; indeed, the avant-garde can be seen as resisting
social classification along with other forms of conventionality. But the
Court is still willing to apply standards like those used in class-biased
blasphemy trials. In NEA v. Finley, for example, the Court upholds use of
"decency" as a standard in making administrative decisions. 4 Rather than
protecting the "matter" or the belief being expressed, the Court left
Congress free to regulate the manner of its expression. Just as the "Comic
Bible" cartoons were thought to be so far beyond the realm of good taste
that they could be left legally unprotected, so too was Serrano's Piss Christ.
However, it is actually in the realm of hate-speech regulations that the
analogy to blasphemy is at its most unsettling. Like the rationales advanced
by blasphemy courts of the nineteenth century, hate-speech decisions have
focused on the manner of the speech in question. Even while striking down
the hate-speech ordinance in question in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,5 the
Court carved out an exception that runs parallel to the nineteenth-century
English case law on blasphemy. St. Paul, the Court noted, can single out "a
particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of express[ion." 26
The majority opinion compared fighting words to a sound truck,
emphasizing the manner of communication rather than its content.
27
Selecting a particular manner of expression to regulate comprehensively,
the Court urged, would save the statute from its problem of selectivity.2"
R.A.V. thus opened the door to a matter/manner distinction of the sort
espoused by Coleridge. 9
22. NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2176 (1998); see also Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (protecting the right of young war protesters to employ offensive language).
23. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2182-83 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the regulation of "indecent" broadcast communications).
24. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2180.
25. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
26. Id. at 393.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. In Ohio v. Wyant, 508 U.S. 969 (1993), a case decided shortly after R.A.V., the Court
seemed untroubled by the criminalization of rude speech. In Wyant the defendants had been
convicted under an Ohio statute providing for increased penalties for ethnic intimidation. See
State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 450 (Ohio 1992). David Wyant, a white man, had occupied i
camp lot next to an African-American couple. When the couple complained to the park
management about Wyant's blaring music, he started yelling, "We didn't have this problem untI
those niggers moved in next to us," and "I ought to shoot that black mother fucker." i. The
Court vacated the Ohio Supreme Court's finding that the statute in question was unconstitutional.
and Wyant's conviction was reinstated. See State v. Wyant, 624 N.E.2d 722, 724 (Ohio 1994).
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In a second parallel, hate-speech regulation is routinely justified by the
threat of violent disorder, much like the threat of social insurrection
supposedly stanched by blasphemy prosecution. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell"
the Court found that hate speech was "more likely to provoke retaliatory
actions.., and incite community unrest." 3' In R.A. V. Justice Stevens
pointed to the risk of riot, although he joined the Court in overturning
Robert Viktora's conviction for burning a cross on an African-American
family's lawn.32 Stevens compared such conduct to burning trash near an
ammunition dump. 33 He glumly reminded his brethren, "One need look no
further than the recent social unrest in the Nation's cities to see that race-
based threats may cause more harm to society and individuals than other
threats." ' While its concern for preventing race riots is laudable, the
Court's reliance on the specter of unrest has uncomfortable parallels with
the history of prosecutions for blasphemy.35
These parallels should suggest something more than the repetitiveness
of history. They also reflect the degree to which the class implications of
speech regulation are absent from American legal thought. We think to ask
if the young are disproportionately represented among convicted hate
criminals,36 but not if the poor might be similarly affected. We may suspect
that such laws weigh more heavily on the Robert Viktoras of the world
rather than on the authors of The Bell Curve,37 but we know little of why
that might be so. Justice Blackmun dubs offenders "hoodlums," ' but still
we do not ask if class bias, conscious or unconscious, might help explain
his reasoning. While the elaborate class consciousness of nineteenth-
century England may seem distant and unattractive, reviewing its history
reminds us that language and class are intimately related. We need to
question whether packaging racism in the wrapping of expensive editions
exempts it from prosecution in the late twentieth century, just as the
30. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
31. Il at488.
32. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 433 n.9.
35. American parallels can also be found in early 20th-century cases using the possibility of
social revolution as justification for the restriction of speech. These cases turned on the supposed
volatility of the audiences being addressed. See, e.g., Bums v. United States, 274 U.S. 328. 335
(1927) ("The purpose and probable effect of the printed matter circulated and of the things said in
furtherance of the declared purposes of the organization are to be considered having regard to the
capacity and circumstances of the persons sought to be influenced.").
36. For identification of youth as an important factor explaining bias crimes, see Alice K. Ma,
Comment, Campus Hate Speech Codes: Affirmative Action in the Allocation of Speech Rights, 83
CAL. L. REv. 693, 698-99 (1995), which notes that at least half the people arrested for hate crimes
are between the ages of 16 and 25. See also LAWRENCE. supra note 21, at 24 (" (White teenage
males commit most bias crimes generally .... ").
37. RiCHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURvE: INrELLiGENCE AND
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
38. RA.V., 505 U.S. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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hallmarks of respectability saved upper-class atheism from blasphemy
prosecutions in the nineteenth century.
-Wendie Ellen Schneider
